Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Concepts of Life and Death - Abortion, Genetic Modification of Humans, and Euthanasia

Both on the birth side and the death side, humans are increasingly forced to make difficult choices. The major three practices which need to be considered are:
  • Abortion
  • Genetic Modification of Humans
  • Euthanasia
The reason why these three practices are all very difficult to conceptualize is because traditional interpretations of what is natural, what is intentional, what is living, what is dead, etc. seem to break down when we get into the finer details.


1. Abortion

First, take abortion. A major argument against abortion runs something like the following. A zygote (or the embryo or the fetus) is no longer part of the mother's body, but is rather an independent living being. Now the zygote is an independent living human being. Therefore, abortion amounts to killing a human being. But killing a human being is immoral/illegal. Hence, abortion is immoral / ought to be illegal.

The key to this argument is the premise that the zygote is an independent living human being. Here again, the argument against abortion can be refined as follows. There is a continuity between the zygote and the baby who will eventually be born. For example, take the baby Adam. Adam, when born, will be said to be the same being as the zygote which he was 12 months ago. On the other hand, one would hesitate to say that Adam was the same being as the sperm or the egg prior to fertilization. Therefore, it is plausible to make the zygote as part of the definition of a human being, in this case Adam. Q. E. D.

The key premise in that argument is the intuition that the zygote-Adam and the baby-Adam are one and the same living human being. This is where I would like to recall the point I was making earlier, namely, that abortion, qua a decision concerning life and death, is very difficult to conceptualize via traditional means. At the moment, the identity between the zygote-Adam and the baby-Adam is based only on a vague intuition. But intuitions go wrong all the time. For example, the ancient Greeks thought that the heart was the seat of the soul because all humans died when they have lost their heart. The introduction of artificial hearts now allows us to see clearly that the human mind, and the mind's identity across time and space, are not necessarily conditioned by the identity of the heart. In the same way, it is more than plausible to anticipate a future where there is little to no ground to the claim that the zygote and the baby are one and the same living human being.

The example I just highlighted about the artificial heart leads to a deeper concern, however. At present, most people believe that the brain is the seat of the identity of one's mind across time and space. However, what if someone invents an artificial, replaceable brain in the future, and succeed in transplanting it onto a human being who manages the maintain his or her sense of identity across time and space? This would radically call into question the assumption that some part of our bodies is essential to the maintenance of our identity.

To come back to the main line of argument, what the above skeptical criticism highlights is the need to define what a "living human being" is without appealing to intuitions. This means that other, alternative definitions - such as the appeals to the "capacity to feel pain" or "the capacity to use and understand language" or "the capacity to think" - which appeal to intuition are at best suspended.

This in term means that arguments both for and against abortion are suspect of overstating their conclusions. The truth seems to be that at present there is no coherent concept of life and of a living human being that will serve as a premise for or against abortion. We do not know and we need to think philosophically, that is to say, without relying on intuitions as premises - this is the real conclusion.

The question remains, of course, as to what one ought to do when one is radically ignorant of the fact of the matter.


2. Genetic Modification of Humans

What was once considered a fantasy has become real, and it seems not too unreasonable to think that in the near future, genetic modification of humans will become possible. This is perhaps the least thought-through of the three practices which I have listed here. The first question is therefore extremely abstract and basic: what does it mean to genetically modify a human being?

One visceral reaction to the prospect of genetic modification of humans is to reject it out of hand as unethical and immoral. The argument here runs something like this. The genetic makeup of human beings are naturally determined. Therefore, to genetically modify a human being is to interfere with nature. Or, from a certain theological point of view, genetic modification might be seen as a human interference into God's design. In either case, the intention of nature or God is treated as an absolute good. Therefore, to tamper with that intention is bad or even evil. Hence, genetic modification of human beings is bad or evil.

The above argument can take on an intense emotional charge when it is accompanied by images from movies such as The Matrix or The Sixth Day. The idea here is that genetic modification of human beings is grotesque.

Now, it is obvious that the argument above is not convincing. Why is our genetic makeup part of nature or God's intention, while, say, the chemical compositions of various liquids or the number of animal species and trees in the world not? After all, no one objects to synthesizing new liquids or wiping out germs, harmful bacteria, and predatory insects and beasts. We even seem to permit cross-breeding of biological species as well as the creation of new chemical compounds which serve no particular purpose. Why suddenly this reaction when the practice in question is genetic modification?

The riddle deepens when we consider that the human beings who modify each others' genetic makeup are also part of nature or of God's design. What does it mean for nature or God to turn against itself? Does it even make sense to refer to the idea of nature or of God at this point?


3. Euthanasia

Of the three practices listed above, euthanasia is probably the most universally relevant at present. A majority of old people today must think and decide what to do when their bodies enter into certain conditions. Should I ask my family to let me die if I become brain dead as a result of some accident? What if I have cancer and would need my family members to go deeply into debt just to keep me alive? What about brain tumors? Heart attacks? Alzheimer's? Under what circumstances do I ask my family to keep me alive, and under what others do I ask them to let me go?

In recent years, there are additional, more tricky questions coming up. An old person might be perfectly healthy, yet lose the ability to keep on doing whatever he or she has been doing. Moreover, it might be the case that that something which he or she had been doing was essential to what he or she is. In other words, say an old person loses his or her vocation, and sees life as pointless. It seems as if living or dying makes no difference, and in fact other family members are secretly hoping that this person passes away soon - not because they do not love him or her, but purely because the whole thing has become so monotonous to the point where nobody can find any point in prolonging the same old cycle one more day or one more year.

In both cases, the first question to be asked is: what does it mean for a human being to die? The possibility of euthanasia suggests that death, at least for humans, is not a natural phenomenon. Death needs to be seen not as a disease but rather as the realization of a will. When Sam dies, it is not that something tragic called "death" happens to Sam. Rather, Sam wills to die.

But does not this way of talking equate all forms of death with suicide or homicide? In one sense, yes, it does, because here I am defining death as something which human beings, not nature, bring about. On the other hand, there is an obvious distinction to be made between suicide/homicide and other forms of death. How to make this distinction rigorously is a philosophical problem.

Another philosophical problem is how to conceptualize life in light of this new definition of death. If death is a result of human will, then life, also, is a decision to not die. In this way, another "natural" presupposition, namely that living is normal while dying is abnormal, is called into question. If one lives, then one also decides not to die. Hence, one decides to live. Here again, ideas of nature and of God are of little help in conceptualizing life and death. Moreover, a biological definition of life would not help either, since that, again, tacitly relies upon the idea of nature and sees human life as a natural phenomenon. The task of conceptualizing life and death as products of the human will is, therefore, another philosophical problem.