Hegel opens the Science of Logic with the question: "with what must the beginning of science be made?" This question implicitly presupposes that the beginning is to be made with a thought which can be captured by the question in the form of "with what..." The word "what" indicates that there are many thoughts, out of which one stands out as the best option with which to make the beginning.
However, what if the "what" and the way of thinking implied in that question already limits the options from which the beginning is to be made? Or, even before the question of "making" a beginning, what if the very thought of the beginning as such already implies certain other thoughts? If a beginning is to be made, then the thought of the beginning must first be described thoroughly. Otherwise, philosophy fails to live up to its ambition to begin from presuppositionlessness categorically.
The first question is this: "does the beginning already imply a determination?" In other words: "is there a thought, or thoughts, which are excluded in the very resolve to begin?" In asking about the beginning in this way, the beginning itself becomes known as a category unto itself, that is, as a unique thought-determination.
If the beginning were not a unique thought determination -- in other words, if the beginning was not determinate, not distinguished from anything else, then there would be no beginning, because it would make no different to anything whether it is a beginning or a non-beginning. The beginning, therefore, is necessarily determinate, and it is distinguished from a non-beginning.
Two options are open here. On the one hand, the distinction between the beginning and the non-beginning presupposes a distinction between the being and non-being of the beginning, and therefore the category of being and its negation, i.e. non-being, or conversely the category of nothing and its negation, i.e. being. On the other hand, the contents or determinations of these categories depend upon how one begins to think about them and through them. Therefore, the beginning determines what is meant by being and nothing. Moreover, if this is the case, then being and nothing do not have any contents in themselves independently of the way in which the beginning is made, or of the determination of the beginning.
Here, the question is refined. Now, the question is this: "how is the beginning, such that the beginning determines being and nothing?" A related question is: "is there a distinction between being and nothing on the side of a non-beginning?" On the side of the beginning, being and nothing have no contents on their own. On the side of a non-beginning, i.e. where thought is not determined to begin, we do not yet know whether being and nothing have or don't have a specific, necessary determination.
What does it mean for thought to not begin? Is it possible to think without beginning to think? Can the non-beginning reflect back into the beginning, such that the second beginning is none other than the determination to think without beginning?
What does it mean to be determined to begin thinking by not beginning to think? It cannot mean to just "take up" whatever is "already there" -- this already is a determinate beginning. What, then, does it mean for thought to not begin?
